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CYCLICALMARKUPS: THEORIES AND EVIDENCE
ABSTRACT
IfChanges in aggregate demand were an important source of
macroeconomic fluctuations, real wages would be countercyclical
unless markups of price over marginal cost were themselves
countercyclical. We thus examine three theories of markup
variation at cyclical frequenciea. The first assumes only that the
elasticity of demand is a function of the level of output. In the
second, firma face a tradeoff between exploiting their existing
customers and attracting new customers. Markups then depend also
on rates of return and future sales expectations; a high rate of
return or expectations of low sales growth lead firms to assign a
lower value to future revenuea from new customers.Firma thus
raise prices and markups. In the third theory, markups are chosen
to ensure that no one deviates from an (implicitly) collusive
understanding. Increases in rates of return or pessimistic
expectationa then lead firms to be less concerned with future
punishments so that markups fall. Aggregate poat—war data from the
U.S. are moat consistent with the predictions of the implicit
collusion model.
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Real wages are not strongly countercyclical. As pointed out already by Dunlop (1938) and
Tarshis (1939), this presents difficulties for models in which technological possibilities do not vary
at business cycle frequencies. For, why should firms be willing to pay more to workers when output
is high and hence the marginal product of labor is low? One obvious possibility, suggested by
Keynes (1939), is that the desired markup of price over marginal cost is low when output is high.
In this paper we consider three leading models of endngenous markup variation which might
explain variations in real wages at business cycle frequencies. The first simply postulates that
the elasticity of demand facing the representative firm varies over the business cycle. This is the
underlying idea behind Robinson (1932) and Ella (1989). The second is based on the customer
market model of Phelps and Winter (1970), the macroeconomic consequences of which have been
explored by Gottfries (1989), Greenwald and Stiglits (1988) and Phelps (1989). Finally, nor third
model is based on the model of implicit collusion of Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) and R.otemberg
and Woodfnrd (1989).
The first model is essentially static; it does not depend on expectations firms hold about the
future. The other two are dynamic. The price charged in the customer market model is the result
of a tradeoff between exploiting the existing customer base and attracting new customers whose
profitable purchases come in the future. Similarly, pricing in the implicit collusion model involves
a tradeoff between current profits from undercutting one's competitors and the future profits from
maintaining collusion in one's industry.
While expectations about the future matter in both of the latter models, their effect is rather
different in the two cases. In the customer market model, large purchases in the future inducefirms to try to enlarge their market share so that prices and markups tend to (all. In the implicit
collusion model, by contrast high expected future demand increases the costliness of a price war,
making it possib]e for firms to raise prices and markups. The first model is thus one where low
prices are like an investment; prices are cut when the future looks better than the present. The
second is one where a rosy future leads to price increases.
This is the implication of the two models that we actually test. Therefore, our test is somewhat
broader than a test of the specific models that we consider. To test this implication of the models1
we need to measure markup variations. Like Bils (1987), we do this by making assumptions on the
aggregate production function and exploring the consequences of the equality between the markup
and the ratio of the marginal product of labor to the real wage. Unlike him, we do not impose the
assumption that the elasticity of substitution between hours and other inpute equals one. Also,
our production function simultaneously allows for fixed costs (overhead labor), but does not imply
that output can be increased by adding only production workers. In our general formulation, the
marginal product of labor, as a function of output and factor inpute, depends upon the state of
technology. Hence we use a generalization of Solow's (1957) method for measuring changes in
technological possibilities and, armed with this measure, we obtain estimates of markup variations
that depend only on observable variables.
We show that, for plausible parameter values, these measured variations in the markup tend to
be quite countercyclicaL One parameter that we do not measure directly and which influences our
result is the avrragr level of the markup. Given that measured profits over and above the required
return to capital seem to be small, a higher level of the average markup means that there is a wider
gap between average costs and marginal cost. if this gap is due to fixed costs, eccsoonsies with high
markups also have high fixed costs. But, in this case, a given percentage change in factor inputs
corresponds to a much larger percentage change in the factors that are productive at the margin.
Thus high estimates of the average ms.rknp imply that marginal cost rises substantially in booms,
thus leading to couotercyclical markups. This is particularly true of the estimates of tbe average
markup derived by Hall (1988a) from observations on the response of total factor productivity to
changes in aggregate demand.
While the assumption of a high average markup produces measures of the markup that, bynecessity, rise when employment falls it does not have any direct implication for the relation-
ship between markups and expectations about future profitability. We show that our constructed
markups tend to rise when the rate at which firma discount future cash flows is low (and when the
discounted value of future profits is high). We thus provide some direct evidence for the class of
models where high prices are like an investment.
The paper proceeds s.s follows. In Section 1 we present the framework underlying all three
models. Section 2 presents the static model of time varying elasticities of demand. Section 3
develops the customer market model, while Section 4 develops the model of implicit collusion.
Section 5givesthe details of how we construct our measures of markup variations. Section 6
explains two methods for testing the implications of the three models. Section 7discussesour data
and section 2 gives our empirical results. Finally, section 9 puts our results in context by discussing
the role of the various models of markup variation in explaining fluctuations in aggregate activity.
1. The Basic Setup
We consider economies with many symmetric firms whose total number is normalized to equal
one We will focus on symmetric equilibria, so that in equilibrium all firms charge the same price
at time t,P1.For simplicity we will treat the output of these symmetric firms as the numerahe so
that, in units of the numeraire, 1 is one.
These symmetric firms have access to a technology of the form
= F(K,ze(He (i)
where y, H and K represent respectively firm i's output, labor input aod capital input at time
t.Thevariable r1representsthe state of technology at time t, so that a higher a corresponds to
a more productive period, while if1isthe amount of labor devoted to fixed costs. The allowancs
for an overhead labor requirement is a way of introducing decreasing average costs, of the kind
needed to reconcile an assumed markup of price over marginal cost with the apparent absence of
significant pure profits in 11.5. industry.'
Each firm has access to competitive markets for labor and capital services. At time t,firmi
ro, nvicitsct on lhn esifleec. el inernninereturn.,in its .se.t of ;,,ttiinnoeso ef mariesl cost on aveesee, in
ILS. inc5o.try, so. Hill lssl•
3must pay a wage tug for each unit of labor and it must pay r5 for each unit of capital that It rents.
Given the homogeneity nf F and competitive factor markets, marginal cost at tisindependent of
the number of units that the firm produces and is equal to
minw1h + rgka.t.F(k, hh) =1 (2)
The assumption that F is homogeneous of degree one so that marginal cost is constant is not
essential for the models to be presented below. However, it simplifies our analysis by allowing us
to write the ratio of two firms' prices as the ratio of their respective markups. We denote the
equilibrium markup by p,; this is the equilibrium ratio of the price charged hy all firms to marginal
cost. Since both w1 and r1 are denominated in the units of the typical firm's output, marginal cost
in (2) ie simply equal to I/pt. Letting firm i's ratio of price to marginal coat be denoted by .4,
firmi's profits gross of fixed coats in units of the numeraire are equal to
(s)
Ata symmetric equilibrium all firms charge the same price and, given our normalization, the
sales of each equal the aggregate level of sales Y. We denote by X5 each firm's expected present
discounted value at t of the stream of individual profits from period t+1 onward:
(4) q5ps,
Here E5 takes expectations conditional on infnrmatioo available at 1,andqg+1/q5 is the stochastic
asset pricing kernel, so that any random yield ;.(inunits of period t+ j goods)has a present
discounted value in period t of E,(q,÷5r8+1/q1).
We now distinguish between three models that differ in both the specification of demand and
of market structure.
2. The Static Monopolistic CompetitIon Model
Irs this model each firm behaves like a monopolistic competitor i5 that it takes as given the
prices of all other firms, the level of marginal cost and the level of aggregate demand. As in the
"symmetric" monopolistic competition model of Dixit and Stiglits (1977), we assume that thedemand for firm i depends on the ratio of its price to the average puce charged by all other firms.
Equivalently, firm i's demand at t depends on the ratio of its own markup /4tothe markup charged
by all other firms in the symmetric equilibrium we will consider, Pt-Thuswe write firm i's demand
as
14=D(&,Y1) (5)
where the finn's demand depends on aggregate demand through the level of aggregate sales Y.
To preserve symmetry we require that the demand for each firm be equal to Y if they all charge
the same price. Thus we require that D(l,Y) = Y. A special case to which we will return has
humothetic preferences so that demand is the product of a function of relative prices sod aggregate
demand Y. In this special case both I) and the partial derivative of D with respect to relative
prices, D5, are proportional to Y.
Since the firm's problem is static we can obtain its decision rule by substituting (5) into (3)
and maximizing with respect to /4.Thisyields the familiar formula
(6)
Pt
Ina symmetric equilibrium all firms charge the same markup, so that the markup can rise if and
only if —D5(1,Y)/D(l,Y) = —D5/Y, the elasticity of demand evaluated at the point where all
prices are the same, falls. Thus the markup can rise with a change in Y if and only if preferences
are not homothetic. There is little a priori reason to expect either direction of deviation from
homotheticity, so that markups seem as likely to rise with increased sales as to fall.
3. The Customer Market Model
The customer market model continues to have each firm maximizing profits with respect to
its markup taking the markup in all other firms as given. It differs in that demand has a dyoamic
pattern. A firm that lowers its current price not only sells more to its existing customers, hut also
expands its customer base. Having a larger customer base leads future sales to be higher at any
given price- One simple formulation that captures this idea involves writing the demand for firm I
at time t as
'In writingthed.e'.ndfunction (SIwe hove avoided coe.idenee the effect ol nh.,cg ol tc. oonpo.itinn or dnnaod on tto
overnILicri,eelasti,itro,cdhenc.ocm.rkur. w. hsvtdoaethinbec.uoewe are ,strreoted,o th.effect.ofuboog.. in .ggeeg.t.
demand sod no perciostar ooecpanitiosal shift stern. plsu.ibty succi.tnd withslorgefnsotrn of oh.ngn. in .sgree.t. den,sod.
5= Q,Y4)m'ii<o, i(i,Y) = Y (7)
the variable rn is the fraction of total demand Y, that goes to firm i if it charges the same price
as all other firms, The market share m' depends on past pricing behavior according to the rule
= g(i)m;g' c 0,g(1)1 (8)
so that a temporary reduction in price raises firm i's market share permanently. Equations (6) and
(7) capture the idea that customers have switching costs, in a manner analogous to the models of
Gottfriea (1986), Klemperer (1987), and Farrell and Shapiro (i9ss). A reduction in price attracts
new cuatomers who are then reluctant to change firms for fear of having to pay these switching
costs. One obvinu.s implication of (6) and (1) is that the long run elasticity of demand, i.e., the
response of eventual demand to a permanent increase in price, la larger than the short run elasticity
of demand. in our case, a firm that charges a higher price than its competitors eventually loses all
its customers, though this is not essential for our analysis.
The firm's expected present discounted value of profits from period, onward is thus
(9)
Firm i chooses j4 to maximize (9), taking as given the stochastic processes .(p} and (Yj}.
Therefore
n4 04 \1c411 Y) +PJ1ç,Y) —J+
9r():1frtLf14+C111(fti±i )iigQfhe)=0. (10)
where suhscripts denote partial derivatives. At a symmetric equilibrium where all firms charge the
same price, each has an rn, equal to one and g equals one in all periods. So the expectation term in
(io) is equal to the common preseot discounted value of profits given by (4). Therefore, (10) gives
3Thi. ides ho. been spp5ed to the sosifEl of iotene.tieeeJ pricier to.,,.. by Cotifrin 5555) sod floos sod Klempec'er
(1gm).
6the markup Pt as:
—___________________ jLt= j.4Xt,Yi) =
Y+ n(t,Y1) +g'(l)Xg (ii)
The second order conditionfor amaximum of profits implies that the denominator of (ii) is
negative. Therefore, the derivativeofp With respect to X is negative. An iocrease in X means
that profits from future customers are high so that each firm lowers its price in order to increase its
market share. The effect of current sales Y2 nn the markup is more ambiguous. In the homothetic
case where 'j is proportional toy, (11) implies that the markup depends only on the ratio X/Y;
the ala.sticity of the markup with respect to 3' is equal to the negative of the elasticity with respect
to X. A high value of 3' means that current customers are relatively profitable so that, in the
homothetic case, raising prices and exploiting existing customers is relatively attractive. This
intuition must be modified when the elasticity of demand facing an individual firm depends on the
level uf sales. Differentiating (11) and ignoring time subscripts, the derivative of p with respect to
Yis
—p + (1 —
Y+qs(1Y)+?(1)X
whichis positive in the homothetic case where qj, the second partial of'7 with respect to relative
prices and 3', is zero. This derivative can ha negative it jj is sufficiently negative so that demand
becomes much more elastic as output rises. However, because this term is multiplied by (1 —p) the
derivative is negative only if the magnitude of 1lis is substantial, particularly if the typical markup
is small.
Put broadly, equation (ii) says that lower pricsa are a form of investment, an investment in
market share. Such an investment is attractive when the present discounted value of the future
returns from investment (X) are high relative to the payoff from current consumption, which in the
homothetic case is represented by 3'. While the atory is logically distinct from the static model,
they are closely related. An increase in X through, for instance, a fall in interest rates and discount
rates does not malta the demand curve more elastic. However, it raises the importance of the sales
that go to customers with relatively elastic demand, thus promoting reductions in price.
74. The Implicit Collusion Model
The model in this section is a simplified presentation of Rotemberg and Woodford (1989).
We consider an economy with many industries, each of which consists of is firms. The is firma in
each industry collude implicitly m the sense that there is no enforceable cartel contract, hut only
an implicit agreement that firma that deviate from the collusive understanding will be punished.
On the other hand, the firms in each industry, even when acting in concert, take other industries'
prices, the level of aggregate demand, and the level of marginal cost as given. Abusing the language
somewhat, we can view industries as monopolistic competitors in the usual sense, while the firms
within each industry collude implicitly.
Keeping this distinction in mind, we write the demand for firm i in industry jas
= Dâ(1i,Y) =Y (12)
The function V is symmetric in its first isargumentsexcept the ith, and the functions V (for
=1,...,n) are all the same after appropriate permutation of the arguments. Using (3), profits
for firm in industry jwhenall other firms in industry jchargethe markup 4,whilefirms in
other industries all charge p, equal
(i3)
If each firm lived for only one period, it would maximize (13) with respect to its own markup
treating the markups of all other firms as given. The resulting Bertrand equilibrium in the industry
would have a markup equal to p8(s1). if the firms in an industry charged more than p8(s,Y),
individual firms would benefit from undercutting the industry's price. Higher prices, with their
attendant higher profits, can only he sustained as a subgame perfect equilibrium if deviators are
punished after a deviation, If firms interact repeatedly and have an infinite horizon, there are many
equilibria of this type and these differ in the price that is charged in equilibrium.
We assume that firma succeed in implementing that symmetric equilibrium that is jointly best
for them. That is, their implicit agreement maximizes the present discounted value of expected
equilibrium profits for each firm in industry j,takingas given the stochastic processes for {t±}and
{Y5}. As shown by Abreu (1982), the punishment for any deviation ie as severe as possible in the
8optimal symmetricequilibrium.Therefore a deviating firm sets price to maximize current period
profit 11'.Theresult is that the singleperiodprofits of a deviatingfirmequal:
p/—I .)4 s4' 14 lT= max (14)
s?hhMi Mi Mi Mi
After any deviation, the firms in the industry punish the deviator to the maximum possible extent.
Because of the possibility of exit1 the voluntary participation of the firm that is being punished
precludes it earning an expected present value lower than zero after a deviation. We give conditions
that ennure that a deviator indeed earns a present discounted value of zero in Rotemberg and
Woodford (iggg).i
Let .V denote, by analogy to (3), the expected present discounted value of the profits that
firms in industry jcanexpect to earn in subsequent periods if there ass no deviations. Then, if the
expected present value of profits after a deviation equal zero, firms in industry jwillnot deviate
as bug as
(15)
where fl is the value of fI'/ when finn charges the same price as the other firms in its industry.
We consider the case where the incentive compatibility constraint (15) is alwaye binding.'
At a symmetric equilihriuzn, all industries have the same markup so that each firm sells Y, and
X equals X1. Using D(p,Y) to denote .17(1,..., p,. ,.,l, 1'), we then have from (13)-(15)
max[, —-L}pp,ç)
= [i — (16)
where p represents the relative price chosen by the deviating firm. Equation (16) can be solved for
p yielding once again Me = p(Xe, Z).Therelevant solution of (18) is the one where Mi exceeds the
Bertrand level, so that deviators undercut the equilibrium price and p is less than 1.
Differentiation of (16) yields
'The main condition requiea that there enet m nnalier than one such that when .11 Snn. in indu.t,y j charge a machop
or P white the 5a ia etharindushaso eharlea markup5rnatethan or aqua] Isone,a devi.teg tree caemnth nail peeliivn
quantitieshrcharging a peks ia excess of marginal cost. Thuassumption rnquirthatthe goodopredated by Crews ia the
induitrybe relatienip goadsubstitutes. Itensure.that the dnviatin5 finn cannot mob. positiveprofileinthe portodsfollowing
a deviation hrdenasagfrom the behavior itis ecreeted to foliosalterthe deviation.
lc Rotomherg nod woodrord l1955 we give coeucfition. under which a d.tenninnsio nt.aoir stat. azi.t. in which (151 ii
eJwayu hioding. We nIne chowthat, for •muJlenough.tocha.iic .hock.,there continues toeoiat apertuehednqaiiibrioee, iv
which 11) ainapu bind..
pp1
(17)
Since p is less than one, D(p,Y) >D(1,Y)=Yand px is positive. An increase in X, which raises
the cost of deviating, raises the equilibrium markup. Such an increase in the markup is necessary
to maintain the equality between the costs and the benefits of deviating.
We can also bound the response of the markup to changes in A from above. In particular
A = (p -1/p)D(p,Y)-(1-I/p)Y c (1- I/pj(D(p,Y) - P&'
(15)
where the first equality follows from (16), the inequality feom p c 1, and the last equality from
(17). Therefore, the elasticity of p with respect to X, while positive, is smaller than p —1.
The effects of changes in Y are more ambiguous. In the homothetic case, where Dy =D/Y
for all prices, (16) implies that p depends only on the ratio X/Y. Thus an i.n:rease in Y raises the
benefits to deviating now and the markup falls. More generally, py is negative as long as increases




While this must bold in the homothetic case where D2/D equals l/Y, it could fail more generally if
YD2/D is sufficiently leas than one forp <1.This quantity is increasing in p only if the elasticity
of demand faced by a deviating firm, —pDj(p,Y)/D(p,Y), is a decreasing function of Y. For goods
that are close substitutes, the optimal deviating p is only slightly less than one, even though flj
is much larger than fl. Since YDI(1,Y)/D(I,Y) =1,it seems likely that YD1/D is not much
smaller than one, so that py >0is implausible in this model.
5. ConstructIon of a TIme Series for Msrlctsp Variations
Empirical estimation of a markup equation requires first that we construct a time series for
cyclical variations in the markup over the postwar period for the U.S. Our method is quite simple.
We aaaume (as in the theoretical models diacuased above) an aggregate production function of the
from (i) The markup of price over marginal cost is then
'Ourracultisee ]ittt. ifected bythe choiceof the (toctic,,.]formIll cnnarem itch so
1
10F(K, zt(H5 —#)) ()
Wecan thus construct a markup series from aggregate time series for output, factor inputs, and
real wages, given a quantitative specification of the production function F (including a vaiue for
ft1),andgiven a time series for the productivity shocks {}.Theproductivity shocks present
an obvious difficulty, since they are not directly observed. In our previous paper (Roternherg and
Woodford (1989)), we measured the effects of a particular type of aggregate demand shock on the
markup by choosing a shock (innovations in real military purchases) that could be argued to be
uncorrelated with variations in (Sf}. Thiswill not, however, suffice if we wish to construct a time
series for cyclical variations in the markup over the entire postwar period. Here we propose instead
to reconstruct a series for {rj} from (I), using what is essentially the familiar Solow (1957) method,
corrected for the presence of imperfect competition and increasing returns to scale.7
We consider a log-linear approximation to (1) around a steady-state growth path along which
H1 grows at the same rate as R1,whileK and Y grow at the same rate as z1k1.t This approxi-
mation yields
F1K -zF2(H—H) if ,[a—(---)iJ (20)
wherehatted lower case variables refer to log deviations from trend values, and where the other
expressions represent constant coefficients evaluated at the steady-state growth path.
We assume that, for both factors, the marginal product equals ?timesthe factor price in the
steady-etate growth path, where M is the steady-state markup. Therefore, F1K/Y and sFsH/Y
are respectively equal to p'sgandPH, where spcand5H are payments to capital and labor as a
share of output's value. Because F is homogeneous of degree I, Euler's equation implies that
Bycontroot, 1,. oc.um.d iii. of01,.Modcoot,to rslatiootototal costs (os more os.n5ly, efaronge coat in rsladon to
,eer1inojcost), reyrmorted hors by the anng. stat of 9,/He,tot.opsrtaat to stir roedoisoos.
°Bf. liss)avoid,th. need to roajintot soils foe (a,) altogether by a.euraiog • Oobb-lDocek. production fuoctias with
sooverhead reqoinmeto(at lest for peodardeahattie)so thatP5 is (55) coo he replead byeli/H,.w. chowthouthis
mmcdv.functional form is sot oocnazy and areabletorossi&rtheesn.atses ofalternativeasomphonoreeor,aogfacto,
•ub,titrtahility end the sin of toed cost..
0Tte .nicnlption that tho overhead toter requirsoest rowsata conetunt rat, allows tie to obtain o stationery equilibrium
with growth (in which, comae other china,thepolioof toedcost. to total costo fitictootos around a constant rejuo). Prosuinably
chi. ,hould be doe to growth is the variety of good. produced os the economy growl, althaigh we do not model that eoptleitty
here, w.toddha,. osumed iootoad that the overhead labor requirement is nonetent is per copta torm.. Booaas, p.r oapime
boon appeor .'aiionary, this too would how allowed ma to apply our teehoiqueo.
11H-li i 5K+ —1 (21)




Thisallows us to construct a time series for g from the variations in detrended output and fac-
tor inputs, given average factor shares, and given values for the single free parameter p. Thje
parameter is set to I in Solow's original method.5
Assuming that w and z1 have the same trend growth rates, the analogous log-linear approxi-
mation of (19) yields
- -______ ist=zt—wt+—----—k—; —_______
C 11K
where e represents the elasticity of substitution between the two factors in F, evaluated at the
factor ratio associated with the steady-state growth path. Substituting (22) for i this becomes
-______ -(I—e)p'a, 1fsg -
Its—mt (23) CCJLBge—ep'sl_pisK
Hence we need to specify only the parameters e and f in addition to the observable factor
shares to construct our markup series Assigning numerical values to e and js' is admittedly
somewhat problematic. Our basic strategy is to determine ranges of plausible values, and then to
check the degree to which our results are sensitive to the exact values choeen for e and p5 within
those ranges. The parameter e is often callbratedn in real busine cycle studies on the basis
of observed long run trends. The absence of a significant trend in factor shares, in the face of a
significant trend in relative factor prices over the last century, is sometimes taken to indicate an
elasticity of substitution near 1. But this is not a particularly persuasive justification. First, this
fact might simply indicate that most technical progress is labor-augmenting, as in (1), rather than
a long run elasticity of 1.
Second, there need not be much relationehip between the long run elasticity and the short run
elasticity (relevant for our purposes). On the one hand, if one assumes a "putty-claf technology,
5Tmhaten5p, tntows c.letd,Liee nice diffen from (22) in sLlc.ethe Lh.Carter•hareatobe timn-en.ryiee, Thu'meant.to
prn..nen.om.highe-erthr t.r,rj ,e th.T,yIereerie. espinsionof(1),butthen ii then Little reason to drop ether second-order
term..w.thai.1mb her, to a.inpl.log-linear apprasimatine.
12the short run elasticity of substitution might be much less than that indicated by long run trends.
But, on the other hand, cyclical variations in capital utilization might make the relevant short run
elasticity even greater than the long run elasticity Suppose that the current production function
is not (1) hut
=F(saKt,z4(Ht—
Pig))
whereqrepresentsthe degree of utilization of the capital stock. Then if ug varies positively with
—Rg)/Kgat cyclical frequencies, the relevant elasticity e in the above calculatiuns is the one
associated with the reduced.furrn production function
= P(K1, zg(Hs —ft)) =F(u(1' Hi)) Kt, rg(Hg —Ri))
But,if the long run utilization nf capital is constant and thus independent of trends in factor
prices, the elasticity one would infer from growth observations would be that associated with the
true pruduction function evaluated at constant u.1t In this case, the measured long run elasticity
of substitution would be smaller than the relevant short run elasticity. We must thus admit that
the relsvant elasticity is not easily measured. We take as our baseline case the value e =
(Cobb- Dnuglas), the value must often used is real business cycle studies, but we also consider the
pnssihilities e = C.5 and e = 2.
We are similarly unable to directly nbeerve p'. Hall (l988a) proposes to measure it on the
basis that the ig series given by (22) should be orthogonal to changes in variables such us real
military purchases or the party of the President. Hall uses value added as his measure of output
and finds values above 1.8 for all seven of his I-digit industries. t}ornowits, Hubbard, and Petersen
(1988) use gross output instead and nbtain smaller estimates of f for most industries; a value of
around 1.6 is typical of their findings. Hnwever, since we study the behavior of value added, their
estimate would have to be adjusted upward to be appropriate for our analysis. Nonetheless, we
take 1.6 as our baseline case, but also consider the value 2. As some readers may be skeptical about
the existence of markupa even as high as 60%, we present some results for a markup variation series
°Ttssdifference in respoes. iscps5s.J so oppo.sd IssecWw thuogs sdght beduetosdjatmeet costs, so that elssoga is
cipilaluIiIi.soinn esuld be used ,ssrs in the cat ot trsnoitoey fluctuations. Property taking isis sosouni such udjoutmere
costswould,of cows., require, more corripLir sled spsciltc.don ot production possiblllta.
13constructed under the assumption p =1.1,although we regard this as an extremely conservative
choice.
Figures I, 2, and 3 illustrate the constructed series for markup growth rates over the postwar
period, under different assumptions regarding p' and e. These are constructed by ignoring the
departures of capital from trend, k,andusing the data described in section 8 below. Because
we make so assumption about the average leve! of the markup in order to construct the series,
we present here only our constructed series for markup changes, to snake it clear that we do not
pretend to have directly measured the level. Figure 1 represents our baseline case, jf =1.6,e1
Figure 2 shows the consequences of assumiog instead e =0.5,while Figure 3 presents the case
=2,r =1.In each case, the growth rate of hours is shown as well; it is clear that for each of
these sets of parameters the constructed series displays strongly countercyclical markup variations,
The effects nfparameter variation are easily understood. Assuming a lower elasticity implies
a sharper decline in the marginal product of hours in booms, and so increases the amplitude of
the countercyclicsl varzstioo in the series constructed foe .Assuminga higher jf implies a
higher steady state k/H because of (21), and hence a larger estimate of the percentage increase in
ifs —kfor any given observed increase in ifs. For any given e, this then implies a sharper decline
in the marginal product of hours in booms, so that a higher pt results in a rester amplitude of
countercyclical variation in ftt. (Note the different scales for the markup series in Figures 1-3.)
Our results on the countercyclical pattern in the markup confirm the conclusion of Bils (1987),




where H1 denotes log deviations of the share of hours. If p' equals one, and given that 5H +5K =1
(so that there are then also no fixed costs),is simply the negative of whichis not very strongly
cyclical. But if we assume p' > 1 (sod hence increasing returns), then a countercycljcaj term is
added to ji, Bus assumes instead constant returns (and ignores the final term in (24)), but points
out that the relevant wage 'iii is the marginal wage (the wage paid for marginal hours) rather than
the average wage. These two can differ if the utilization of overtime labor is cyclical and if overtime
14hours must he paid more than straight-time hours. With this correction, be obtains
=Ht
—
whereU1 represents the log deviation of the ratio of the marginal wage to the average wage. In
the Appendix we show how to compute this correction with our data. Bils' method for estimating
,i depends crucially upon regarding the overtime premium as allocative. For a criticism, see Hail
(1988b). Because we are uncertain of the extent tn which Bils' treatment of the overtime premium
is just Wed, we present moat of our results without this correction.
Our specification of production possibilities is obviously overly simple in many respects, and
many of its shortcomings deserve more careful attention in the future. We should, however, note
that many of the most obvious corrections to our simple measure would tend to imply even stronger
evidence for countercyclical markup variation. One might wish to consider adjustment coats for




where .i represents the shadow cost of increasing hours in period tin addition to the wage. As-
suining a convex adjustment coat function, Agwillbe positive when hours are increasing (due to
current adjustment costs) or higher than they are expected to he in the future (due to expected
future adjustment costs), and similarly negative when hours are decreasing, or lower than they are
expected to be in the future. Hence A1 should be a procyclical correction, and imply an even more
countercyclical markup.
As another example, one might wish to consider composition biases doe to the heterogeneity
of different workers' hours. As many studhe have shown (see, e.g., Kydland and Prescott (1988),
Barsky and Solon (1989)), the most important such hiss has to do with the greater cynical vari-
ability of low wage (and presumably low-productivity) hours. The precise effect of such bias on our
ronclusions depesds upon many aspects of the assumed true model of heterogeneous hours, but it
seems likely that it reduces the extent to which measured markup variations are rouotercyclics.l.
Suppose that low-wage and high-wage hours are two dietinct factors of production, and assume
a Cobb-Douglas production function. We can measure the markup as the ratio of the marginal
15product of low-wage hours to the low wage.11 Then, correspooding to (24), one obtains
-(ftL'Ijgj\ MtsHI4cL —1jh1, —j957
where JiL, represents the log deviation of low-wage hours from trend, 5HL represents the trend
value of the share of payments to low-wage hours in output, and so on. Both 8HLI and kt, should
be more procyclical than the correspondingand A,in(24). These considerations would both
tend to make ftmorecountercyclical when hours are disaggregated. On the other hand, is
smaller than a57, so the direction of the overall bias is not certain.
6. Method for evaluating the competing theories
Our three theories all yield re!atiuoshipe of the form Pt 'p(Xg,Y).For purposes of estimatino,
we adopt the log-linear approximation
ftL=ex1g—EyQs+fl1 (25)
where, again, hatted variables represent logarithmic deviations from trend values, while 'h repre-
sents a possible stochastic disturbance. Examples of stochastic disturbances of this type include
changes in antitrust enforcement and changes in the degree of foreign competition. The static
theory of section 2 implies that r1 is zero. The customer market model implies that e. c 0 while
the implicit collusion model has 0 c £ C (je —i).If one imposes the additional requirement that
the preferences are homothetic, all models imply that ty is equal to e. Even without imposing
homotheticity, the dynamic models imply that ey has the same sign as e unleas the elasticity of
demaod is extremely dependent on the level of demand.
The problem with estimating (25) is that we lack direct observations on 1,. We have two
methods for dealing with this iesue. The first uses measurements of Tohin's q, the ratio of firma'
market value to the value of their capital in place. The total market value of all firms is equal to
A, + K, —t,+ N, where K, equals the current returns to capital plus the present value of the
depreciated capital stock at the beginning of next periodis the present value of fixed costs and
N, captures any additional influences on market values such as the the present discounted value of
''One can eqk,ivaieetly ccaaide it. maricsi prodocc or ti5h .ae bean but idjuiimesi oust, an ucn iik.Iyindi.t,.t ib.
ruli. in chi. can.
16taxes levied from firms as well as random miavalustions of the stock market. Then the logarithmic
deviationofTobin's q should equal
- X - G—X---N - =
X+ K —t++X+ K —t+N
—
X+K—I+N+X+ K—
where the ratios with (.1 + K —Ci+ N) in the denominator represent stesdy state values, and
where ti represents a deviation (rather than a logarithmic deviation) from the steady state value
N.
Tobin's q is one on sveragc so that (X + N —t)equals 0. Letting S'g represent ht times
the last two terms in the previous equation, and using (25) we have
K= egqg —eyft+ Pg+i (26)
Equation(26)can be stimated by ordinary least squares if one is willing to assume that the
residual v +is uncorrelated with any two of the three variables in the equation. In particnlar,
if s' + gisuncorrelated with ft and Ye, we can recover its coefficients by regressing fg on the other
variables. For the residual to have this property, pg would have to hr unimportant and q5 would
have to he correlated only with p,. However shocks to q1 such as changes in antitrust enforcement
might well have a direct effect on Y. Moreover, such shocks are likely to be serially correlated so
that positive realizations of q1 raise Xg andas well. As a result, our estimate of is likely to
be biased upwards. On the other hand, the existence of important vsriatioii in m'1 would tend to
bias this coefficient toward zero if these variations affect only qg.
If, instead,is unimportant and a'1 is uncorrelated with fit and Qg,thenthe coefficients in
(26) can be recovered by regressing fonthe other variables. Examples of shocks to it1 with this
property might include those that affect N1 and some of those that affect .Oneimmediate
difficulty with this reverse regression is that increases in real discount rates lower 4' and it1 so that,
insofar these raise fit,thecoefficient ofwill he biased downwardt Another difficulty is that
important variations in gwouldbias the coefficient of fiinthe reverse regression toward zero so
that the estimated £j would be too large.
Our second procedure starts from the ohservation that
'5Thi.is cossiit,l with the shwecs of equtibriurapm. peatta (X= l tad .tttian neesteNat sees.
17x =i{!![rli÷i+xiiJ} (27)
inthe steady state where capital, output and profits grow at the rate g, the trend value of X4
equals the trend value of I1 divided by (r' —g) where r' is the trend value of the real rate at which
profits are discounted. Therefore, the log-linearization of (27) gives
—g)egit+i+ (1 + g)ig1 —
1+r
whered is the deviation from trend of the real rate of return between t— 1and t.Moreover,(3)
implies that k is equal to?1/(if —1).Henna (25) and (27) together imply that
(r —g)[1+—j
ñt+(ytEtf(1—i+r)(11t+t)
/(?—g)(rx—ey)\ - 1 +
1 +
)Y14.1 — Yt+if+'it (2$)
If one eliminates the expected value operator from (28)andignores the iptermsone obtains an
equation whose residual is supposed to be uncorrelated with information available at t. Following
the suggestion of Hansen (1982) we estimate this equation by instrumental variables.
The presence of the eta's might affect the results from this procedure. In this ease, however,
the estimate of r is biased only if such shocke have effects on both the expected rate of change in
the markup (since enterswith a coefficient almost equal to one) and on the expected rate of
return on financial assets. While this is certainly a possibility it sesma lees likely than that such
shocks affect the levels of q and the markup simultaneously.
7.Data
Our time series for Tobins q comes from Blanchard, Rhee and Summers (1989). Our measure
of the output (value added) of the private sector is obtained from the NIPA as the difference between
GNP and the value added by the Federal, State and local governments. Our index of the prices of
goods is the ratio of nominal to real private value added. Our measure of private hours is obtained
from the establishment survey as the difference between total hours in nonagricultural payrolls and
hours employed by the goveonment. These hours do not have exactly the same coverage as our
18output series,Thus,forour measures to be strictlyaccurate,the percentage changes in agricultural
hours must equal the percentage changes in the hours of private nonagricultural establishments.
We employ two measures of wages. The principal one is a measure of hourly compensation.
This measure equals private employee compensation from the NrPA (i.e. total compensation minus
government compensation) over our measure of private hours. The second measure is average
hourly earnings in manufacturing One advantage of the compensation series is that it has a larger
coverage both in terms of the sectors whose payments are recorded and in terms of the forms of
compensation that are included.'3
8. Empirical Determinants of Marinip Variation
We present results both from estimating equation (26) via ordinary least squares and from
estimating (28) with instrumental variables. We start with estirrtata of equation (26) with the
markup on the left anti q on the right hand side. This specification makes sense if the variations in
c', can be neglected while those of r afect only 4l.
Since the variables are supposed to be logarithmic deviations from trend we include the loga-
rithms of q, y and the constructed markup as well as a constant and a linear trend. Our baseline
markup variation series is constructed aseuming an average markup /? equal to 1.6 and an elas-
ticity of substitution of capital for labor e equal to 1.0,andignoring the overtime premium. We
also allow the residual r to have first order serial correlation, so that it equals Pt—1plusan Lid.
disturbance. L1nder this specification, estimation of (26) for the period 19.47.flTto1988W yields
-0.002t -0.42y + 0.035 q5
(0.6) (0.0007) (0.09)(0.014)
Period: 1952:U-1988:4; pu't.934Rr0.997;D.W.=l.54
Both coefficients are positive as is predicted by the implicit collusion model and thus of the opposite
tannedudnuntat is that tier. ii reason to betiew tic. eoecpeentioa erie. ha. pncaller measurement moe,aInst in
1k.wuywe us. it.w.ci.. nil —e only to aonatnmt our stein on mark,,. tJnarcag fluctuations is capital, .qoalioe
l) jime th. d,tro.dod markup — a function of tic. d.trocd.d ltvel. of output, 9., boarn, I, nod the real vip, ,.A
simele tr.o.furm.iioo allow. on,townts th. ,t.tr.nd.d markup a. a funotioe or the dotrmded labor aba.. (sy = d, +£i
detmmi,doutput sod dotrendod hour.. Tb. us. of the So diffwue .Me tenon is thus oqcdralont lotS. use of the oorronpolatiae
two u.nos for ltcaoa,.tio,w in th. labor shun. To tea skinS ..rcn ha. osorn clinical moouurnouset .rrnr .0useUS data from
1947.111 to isss.t to run r.frmeios. of the Ioa.ithm of oat .bat. on lb. other inoludio a trend and • ,orr.otion for lint order
.ono.l uoreel.iioo. When thu aharn u.in5hourt,..rconp i. oath. right hind tide its rc'nffioinnt equal 0.75 and it .tuti.tiealLy
difforant from urn. Whoo thut amo$ eompnn.atim it on th. riebo hand tide, itt coefficient is s.ss and is not statistically
dietmi from on.. Wo thus ,ao,mt rnjmt thu h1pnthl. that the o.rntnjo .h.r. equal. the compeo.alimc char, plus anise.
19sign than the coefficients predicted by the customer market model. Moreover, since both coefficients
are significantly different from zero at conventional significance levels, the customer market model
is statistically rejected. The fact that LI is statistically different from zero also leads us to reject
static models of the markup where the only detersninant of the markup is the current level of
output.
According to (26), the coefficient on Vt i' Ly while that on q1 is Toobtain an estimate
of LX we thus must obtain a measure for jAccordingto our model, this equals 9."!which
equals ICY/K for our bsse case. The coefficient on qj must thus be multiplied by bY/K to obtain
an estimate of r1. Since Y/K i roughly iO," the implied value for r.v is approximately 0.1. This
is consistent with the restriction that ex be smaller than p —1.
We show in Table 1 bow these coefficients vary as we vary ,e and e. Increases in p raise the
variability of the markup. hi particular, they amplify the reduction infor a given increase in A.
Asa result, a given increase inreduces the markup by more. This explains why the coefficient
on ytfallsas p rises. What is somewhat more unexpected is that increases in p' also raise the
coefficient on q so that the implied value of eX rises as well.
For a given average markup, increases in e raise the coefficient on y while having no effect on
the coefficient on q1. The reason for this apparently anomalous result can he seen from the formula
(23) giving our measure of markup variations. For given p (and hence ff) changes in e affect
markup variations only by affecting the influence of private output on the markup. In particular
iucresses in c raise the weight nf changes in output on the measured markup. These increases
therefore raise the estimated effect of Vt on ffi.
We now turn to estimation of the same equation but with qonthe left hand side. This
produces less biased coefficients If there are important variations in u and unimportant movements
in '.Weagain, let the residual in the equation have first order serial correlation. For our baseline
series on markup variations, the estimation of such an equation including both a constant and a
trend yields;
L4gRot.mberg.ndWoedfed (tees).
20qzr.4.66 -0.006t + 1.29 y + 1.20 s1
(3.5) (0.006)(0.52)(0.48)
Period: 1952:11-1958:4;pto.969 R2=0.952;D.W.=1.81
where the coefficient on the markup equals —andthat on private value added equals L, The
estimates of hoth Ly andare positive. In addition, the ratio of the coefficient onover that
on jl, gives ey which is thus estimated to be near one.
To ohtaio an estimate of 'x we must, again, obtain a measure for bY/K For plausihle values
of Y/K, the resulting estimate of x is very large, too large to be consistent with any of our three
models. One reason for this result may be that increases in expected returns lower X1 and 4' at the
same time so that they also raise Pg. Insofar as this increase in expected returns reduces markups,
the coefficirnt.on markups will be too small and our estimate of ex will be too large. Variations in
'i that are correlated only with /A have the same effect since they bias the coefficient on p toward
zero.
In Table 2 we show how the coefficients on s1 andvary as we vary s' and e. As we increase
the average markup (and hence increase its variability) the correlation between the markup and
stock prices falls so that the former falk. En contrast, the latter coefficient estimate rises as we
increase the average markup.
For a given average markup, increases in e lower the estimated value of ' while having
no effect on the estimate of —.Thereason for this is, once again, that increases in a raise the
ioflunece of Vton?'s Increases in e therefore reduce the regressions estimate of the independent
effect of output on stock prices.
We now turn to the estimation of (28) via instrumental variables. There are several advantages
to this procedure. First, the astiniates are somewhat less subject to endogeneity bias. Second, the
method does not require observations on the present discounted value of profits X. It does however
require information on discount rates (or marginal rates of substitution). Given the inadequacies
of various rates of return as discount rates we experiment with the return on the stock market, the
return on 'flte.sury Bills and the return on prime commercial paper. Third, it allows us to recover
quantitative estimates for both ry and r more easily.
We include a constant and a trend as well as the logarithms of the markup, output, hours,
21the real wage and the level of real returns in our estimation. As instruments we use a constant, a
linear trend, the current and one lagged value of the logarithms of output, the labor input and the
real wage as well as the cx post real return between t —Iand 8.
The results of estimating (28) for the period 1947.111 to 1988W using our baseline markup
series and the return on the stock market are presented in Table 1. We show estimates and summary
statistics for both the case where ey =cx=c,and for the case where Ey and x are allowed to
differ.
The summary statistics reported in table 1 concerning the fit of the two equations are en.
couraging. The Durbin-Watson statistic reveals that little serial correlation remains in the errors.
Because we use more instruments than there are coefficients, the two equations are overidentified.
The test statistic proposed by Hansen (1982) to test these overidentifying restrictions is reported in
the row marked .T and is distributed x2 with 5 and 6 degrees of freedom under th null hypothesis
that the restrictions are valid. The actual values of this statistic are very small, which probably
indicates that the instruments are quite collinear,
Turning to the estimates, consider first the case where ey and xarenot constrained to be
equal. A 1% increase in X is then estimated to raise the markup by about a fifth of a percentage
point. A 1% increase in Y by contrast lowers the markup by about 1%. Both these coefficients are
again and significant.
The estimates of cy and cx s.re inconsistent with the homntbetic versions of both dynamic
models because they are statististically significantly different from each other. Onde hnmotheticity
is dropped, cy can be larger than e1 as long as the elasticity of demand is higher when Y is large.
Then, increases in Y raise dispeoportiooately the number of customers that a deviator gets for a
given change in his markup. This disproportisnte increase implies that deviations become much
more attractive when Y incresses. They thus require relatively large reductions in the markup.
Measurement difficulties provide an alternative explanation for the difference between the two
coefficients. To gain some intuition into the source of this discrepancy suppose first that the average
real discount rate r equals the average growth of private value added p. Then, (28) makes the
expected change in the Iogsrithm of the markup between I and 8+1 a linear function of the expected
change in logarithm of private value added (with coefficient cy) and of the expected real return
22rate between t and t + 1 (with coefficient x).
Giventhat the difference betweenrand p is in fact quite small (it equate 0.0126), the finding
that tyexceedse1 is a finding that the expected change in private value added is more correlated
with the change in the markup than the expected discount rate This could well be due ho the
fact that the relevant discount rate (or firms differs from the expected return on stocke, so that the
measurement error in ? biases the estimate of cx downwards,
An additional prediction of the implicit collusion model is that Cxshouldbe less than p —1.
This restriction is satisfied whether LyandCxareallowed to differ as in the first column or whether
they axe constrained tn he equal as in the second column. In the latter column, the estimate the
elasticity of the markup with respect to X/Y,e,of 0.22 which is well below .6 while remaining
significantly positive.
The difference between the J statistics reported in the two columns can he used to test whether
the restriction that the two elasticities are the same is valid. This is the analogue of the likelihood
ratio test proposed by Gallant and Jorgenson (1979) and it sometimes produces inferences which
are at variance with those from Wald tests based on the standard errors 0f the coefficients, Indeed,
in this case, the Wald test rejects the equality of the two coefficients but the difference between the
two statistics is L35 which is well below the critical value for the x'distributionwith one degree
of freedom.
In Tables 2, 3 and 4wereport variations on the model which are designed to gauge the
robustness of our results. Tables 2 and 3 are devoted to obtaining estimates for different values
of the average markup and for different values of the elasticity of auhetitution. We consider in
particular elasticities of substitution equal to 0.5, 1 and 2 and average markups of 1.1 (which is
much smaller than what is found by the methods of Hall), 1.6 (our base case) and 2. Table 2 is
devoted to estimates when the two elasticities are equal while the estimates of Table 3 are obtained
without imposing this restriction.
The two parameters r' and e affect the results. As explained in Section 5, increases in jf
andreductions in e both increase the tendency of the markup to be countercyclical. it is thus not
surprising that our estimates of r in Table 2 and those of cyinTable 3 rise with pandfall with
e. What is, once again, more surprising is that the estimates of çy in Table 3 which correspond
23to estimates of the effect of eapected rates of return on the markup also increases with p' and
falls with e. Ooe notable feature of Table 2 is that, with the exception of the estimates for an
elasticity of substitution of 0.5 and an average markup of 1.1, the estimates of e are lower than the
corresponding p —1as required by our theory, The estimates of LxinTable 3 are below jf —1
as well.
Table 4 presents other variations while holding the average markup and elasticity of substitu-
tion fixed at our base levels of 1.6 and 1. The first variation replaces one useful instrument of real
returns on stocks the lagged return, by another, namely the lagged dividend price ratio.15 This
has no material effect on our results.
The next two floes present the estimates when we use either the Theasury Bill rate plus a
constant or the commercial paper rate plus a constant s-s a discount rate. The reason we have
to add constants to these rates is that the average real return on these instruments is lower than
the economy's growth rate. Therefore a risk premium must be added to these rates to make the
firm's problem well defined. Somewhat arbitrarily we choose risk premia which are equal to the
difference between the ec000my's growth rate and the average return on the instrument that is
heiog considered. We did this to ensure that the cx is estimated only from the variation in a ante
returns. However, small differences in this assumed risk premium have no effect on our conclusions.
What the second sod third row of Table 4showis that the use of alternative instruments dries
not affect the magnitudes of the coefficients although it does affect the standard errors, In paflic-
ular, when we use the return on Treasury Bills, the estimate of r is not etathticsily significantly
different from zero. Because the commercial paper rate is probably a more accurate representation
of firm's discount rates it is comforting that the results using this latter return are somewhat more
significant. The last two rows show that the results are not sensitive to our use of hourly com-
pensation instead of hourly earnings in manufacturing. Whether we use stock returns or return on
Treasury Bills, this measure olwages produces essentially the same results as hourly compensation.
We finally consider the sensitivity of our results to the addition or the Bile correction for the
difference between the average and marginal wage. We obtain this correction using the method
spelled out in the Appendix. The resulting correction reasonably substantial. We estimate that
See Ksirn s-ed Stsntau5h 15Sl.
24the increased use of overtime implles that, when hours rise by 1% the average wage rises by 0.056
of 1%, while the marginsi wage rises by 0.417 of i%. Using the resulting markup series estimation
of(26) for cur base case yields
-0.002t -0.66y + 0.043 q
(0.1) (o.owo) (0.10)(0.017)
Period; 1952;ll-1988;4; p=O.944R=0.998;D.W.=1.54
The reverse equation with q on the left hand side yields instead
qt=-4.92 -0.006t + 1,49 Vs + 1.06
(3.5) (0.006)(0.55)(0.41)
Period; 1952;H-1988;4; p=O.969flt=0.952;D.W.=1.82
In both cases, the estimate of e' rises with the correction. This is not surprising since the
correction makes marginal cost more procyclical. However, the estimates of xarenot very much
affected by the correction. When we estimate (28) via in.strurnental variables using the corrected
markup series, both estimates rise. The parameters cx and cy are then estimated to equal 0.281
and 1.443 respectively, and their standard errors are 0.07 and 0.24. While both elasticities are now
higher, r1 remains much smaller than p —1.Note also that the rejection of the two alternative
models is even stronger is this case.
9. ConclusIon
Our results provide further evidence that the markup of prices over rnargisal wet moves
countercyclically over the business cycle. We have also found that the type of markup variations
that occur are reasonably consistent with the predictions of the model of endogenoua markup
determination that we have previously discussed (Rotemberg and Woodlord (1989)). Our results are
quite inconsistent with the other leading dynamic' model of markup determination, that proposed
by Phelps and Winter (1970), and we are also able to reject a simple 'static specification, according
to which the elasticity of demand varies with the level of aggregate demand. These conclusions are
consistent with our previous analysis of the effects of military purchases on economic activity; in
Hotemberg and Woodfnrd (1989) we also found empirical regularities consistent with the implicit
collusion model that are harder to reconcile with either of the alternatives.
25These conclusions suggest thatmarkup variationsmaywellbeanimportant mechanism by
whichchangesinthe demand for goods translate into changesin output.In thecase of competitive
product markets, firms' demand for hours fl' is a decreasing function of the current real wage wg,
given by the relation:
Fs(K, zHt) =
An increasein the demand for goods cannot shift this labor demand curve, because the capital
stock is predetermined (in the short run) and the demand for goods shouldnotaffect the state of
technology aj. Hence an increase in the demand for goods, whether as a result of an increase in
government purchases, a change in export or investment demand etc. can increase output (and
hours) only insofar as the short run labor supply curve ie shifted outward, and firms move down
the labor demand curve in response to lower real wages. Such labor supply shifts can result from
intertemporal substitution and, in the case of government purchases, be the consequence of wealth
effects.
But, if this is the way demand shocks affect the economy, they cannot be very important since
real wages fail to he cnunteecyclical (and are furthermore procyclical when composition biases
associated with aggregation of high-wage and low-wage hours are taken account of). Therefore,
only shifts in the aggregate production function can be very important in explaining business cycles
if one maintains perfect competition.
For shocks to the demand for goods to be important, they must increase firm's willingne to
hire additional woelcers at a given real wage. As Kalecki (1938) and Keynes (1939) recognIsed, this
requires that the markup fail in the modified demand for labor function:
Fff(Ks, reNt) = (29)
We have presented evidence that, as required, the markup is indeed countercyclical, and fur-
thermore it moves in a way that is consistent with a coherent theory of endogonous markup de-
terminatioo. That theory, the oligopolistic collusion model, explains how transitory movements
in aggregste demand for produced goods can result in fluctuations in labor demand of the same
sign. The customer market model, by contrast, would be much less promising as a basis for such
26a theory, for most of the sources of variation in aggregate demand that one might be interested in
- for example, temporary increases in export demand,shifts of tastestoward present as opposed
to future consumption, or investment booms due to discovery of especially productive investment
opportunities - would all tend to raise current output relative to future profits, and to raise real
interest rates. Therefore, markupe would tend to increase shifting the labor demand curve inward
so that an even greater labor supply shift and real wage decline is needed to increase output than
in the competitive model.
A simple 'static" specification, p = p(Yg),wouldmean replacing (29) by:
F(K,,i1Hg)=p(F(Kg,zgHg))wg (So)
This still establishes a relation between tv1 and H1thatcannot be shifted, in the short run,
hy anything other than a technology shock. Thus, in such a theory, aggregate demand variations
can affect output and hours only by shifting the short run labor supply curve, lip' is sufficiently
negative, such variations along the fixed schedule (30) might involve an scyclical or even procyclical
real wage. But it would serm to us undesirable to place the entire responsibility for the efficacy of
aggregate demand variations upon their effects upon household labor supply.
If one assumes a representative consumer with preferences that are additively separable be-
tween periods, as is common in the real business cycle literature, the first order condition for
optimal labor supply is:
MRS(C1 H)= SUg
whereC1 denotes aggregate consumption. it is usual to suppose that this marginal rate of substitu-
tion between consumption and leisure is increasing in consumption and decreasing in the quantity
of leisure. Hence an outward shift in the labor aupply curve must coincide with a decrease in con-
sumption; but consumption is prncyclical rather than countercyclical.5' Moreover, such a model
would make it hard to understand the procyclical variation in vacancy rates (the relative constancy
of the Beveridge curve) and quit rates (see, for instance, Parsons (1973)) which both suggest pro-
cyclical movements in firm's willingness to hire workers at a given real wage. Furthermore, such a
"In fact, increaleaincvenau puenhan. ceny wait reduce ntitpis and .npleyment in cueS a cnodn1. 5,, Phd 155a)
tT Rotenbe, aidwnndferd(15551 we chow that increan in ,niii tny upendinelaidcea.uxnphion to rio. nther than in
dneiira.
27model would rely critically both upon labor-supplying hoosebolds being able to quickly understand
and respond to thefutureconsequences of current aggregate shocks, and upon those households'
effective integration into the capital markets, either of which might be doubted. Finally suppose
that, as in many popular efficiency wage models, households are rationed in the amount of labor
they can supply. Then, variations in desired household labor supply due to wealth effects or in-
tertemporal substitution may have little effect upon which of the points consistent with (30) is
realized in equilibrium.
Hence &"dynamic"model of markup determination, such as the nligupolistic collusion model,
offers the greatest prumise as a basis for understanding the role of aggregate demand var,ations in
the generatioo of business cycles, quite apart from the evidence provided here in support of such
a specification. Further quantitative investigations of the extent to which this model ran account
for the character of observed aggregate fluctuations, under various hypotheses about the ultimate
driving shocks, would seem to be warranted.
28Appendix
The BileCorrection
In this Appendix we consider the computation of d, the variations in the ratio of the marginal
wage to the average wage in the presence of varying use of overtime workers. BUs assumes that
total wage payments can be written as:
ws[H+ pV(51)]
wheretvg is the straight—time wage, p is the overtime premium which is assumed to equal 50%, and
V(H)indicateshow many overtime hours firms employ as a function of total hours- Therefore, the
marginal wage (the increased expenditure when hours rise by one unit) is:
w1(l+ pV'(H)]
whilethe average wage is
V(ffj




whilethe corresponding percent change in the average wge is
p(V'ff-V)
H+pV
Thelogarithmic deviation of the ratio of marginal to averagewage, fi is then equal to
To obtain estimates of 'TM and 'TA we use the availahle data on overtime which, unfortunately,
cover only the manufacturing sector We assume that the actual value of overtime hours V1 is given
by V(Hg)timesa stationary residual. We thus run a regression of , the detrended logarithm
of overtime hours, on ui and is. Allowing for an error with both first and second order aerial
correlation yields
291= 7.01 h + 2.69 Mt
(0.59)(8.11)
Period: 1956:ffl-1989:l; AR(1)n1.17AR(2)0.24R'=0.97;D.W.=2.05
Assuming that the residual is uncorrelated with the right hand side variables, the coefficients
in this regrewion sic the coefficients in a second order logarithmic expansion of V(fl). Thus, the
first coefficient equals V'S/V while the second equals one half of + !L1! —(YR)2 Using
these facts, together with knowledge that in our data V/H equals 0.0187, gives a value for 7M of
0.417 and one forof 0.056. As in Bils' analysis, the former is about eight times larger than
the latter. Bus's estimates are both somewhat larger hecause his index of total hours covers only
production hours in manufacturing, so that his average V/H is higher.
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E (0.009) (0.014) (0.022) L S 0.5
A U —0.211 —1.083 —2.099
S B (0.05) (0.69) (0.132) T SITC I 0.016 0.035 0.058 I U (0.009) (0.014) (0.022) T T 1 I I Yt 0.169 —0.416 —1.099
0 (0.05) (0.50) (0.132) ON
F
0.016 0.035 0.058
2 (0.009) (0.014) (0.022)
0.359 —0.083 —0.599




Mt 1.54 1.20 0.86
F (0.82) (0.48) (0.32) L S 0.5
A U 1.12 2.09 2.59 S B (0.52) (0.69) (0.86) T SIT
C I Mt 1.54 1.20 0.86 I U (0.82) (0.48) (0.32) TT 1
Y I 0.53 1.21 1.73
0 (0.53) (0.50) (0.58) ON
F
1.54 1.20 0.86
2 (0.82) (0.48) (0.32)
0.24 0.89 1.31
(0.60) (0.49) (0.52)The basic instrumental variables specifications
US data 1947:111—1988—lU
















Elasticity of the markup with respect to X/Y
AVERAGE MARKUP
Li 1.6 2
E 0.5 0.118 0.224 0.366
LS (0.04) (0.07) (0.12) A 11
$ S
V 5
IT 1 0.099 0.204 0.335




0 2 0.092 0.195 0.322
0N (0.03) (0.05) (0.09)
FTAS5
Instrunental Variables Method




E (0.11) (0.20) (0.32)
L S 0.5
A Ti 0.099 0.185 0.396
S 3 (0.035) (0.06) (0.11)
,TSIT
CI 0.139 1.062 2.127
I U (0.11) (0.20) (0.32)
1' P 1
I I 0.097 0.184 0.293





(0.03) (0.06) (0.09)TABLE 6
InstrumentalVariables Method
Variations with average markup equal to 1.6 and
elasticity of substitution equal, to 1.
Ex
Use of lagged dividend/prica 1.184 0.165
ratio instead of lagged (0.22) (0.05)
return as an instrument
Use of return on Treasury 0.933 0.365
Bills instead of stock raturn (0.17) (0.25)
Use of return on commercial 0.916 0.455
paper instead of stock return (0.19) (3.24)
Use of hourly earnings in 1.274 0.255
manufacturing instead of (0.24) (0.07)
hourly private compensation
Use of hourly earnings and 1.055 0.655
return on Treasury Bills (0.19) (0.29)
Use of hourly earnings and 0.876 0.953
return on ccizmercial paper (0.19) (0.29)